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Just a little take on the morality debate:

I agree with you, Colin, that one person's perspective on morality may not be necessarily either better or worse than another person's perspective. I do want to say add this though: Morality is somewhat ambiguous unless some action results in harm done to another person. I think we can all agree that harm done to another person can be classfied as universally immoral.

I would imagine that denying someone equal rights would also be classified as universally immoral. Let's say there was a particular right that was granted to all adults, let's say the right to vote (we're not going to get into exceptions here such as incarcerated adults). Is it moral for the leadership in a society to deny a certain group of people the right to vote just because they are black? I think everyone can understand how this would be classfied as universally immoral. What about denying a group of people the right to vote because they like to eat peanut butter and jelly sandwiches? Would this be moral? Again, universally, the answer would be no. Now, what if a particular society happened to be quite scared and afraid of peanut butter and jelly sandwiches. Would it be okay to deny the right to vote to people who like peanut butter and jelly sandwiches even though they were raised in a society that taught them to hate peanut butter and jelly? Would it be okay to deny them the right to vote, even though eating PB&J sandwiches doesn't hurt anybody? You tell me. With this line of thought, I am reminded of a line in George Orwell's book "Animal Farm" when one of the animals said, "All animals are equal; some are just more equal than others."

In conclusion, I would say that immoral behavior really is ambiguous, with two important exceptions. These two exceptions, which are considered universally immoral, are:
1. Participating in behavior that will do harm to oneself or others.
2. Denying equal rights.

What are your thoughts?

Hi, just posting my thoughts on this.

I have been thinking about this, and it's not that I think that there is an objective truth about morality (eep. strange ontology scares me). I do, however, think that some people can be wrong about what is moral and what is not moral.

I don't think that the example you used - of wearing blue clothing - is a good one for this discussion. I don't think that any reasonable (non-superstitious or free from other ignorance) society actually places a moral value on blue clothing.

Let's up the ante and talk about dead babies. I think that killing babies for fun is wrong. I think it's wrong for everyone. You, me, Sadam Hussien, Mr Rogers, everyone. I further think that even if you and Mr Rogers got together and decided that it was moral for you to kill babies, I think you'd be wrong. Regardless of your reasoning.

I do not, however, think that there is one correct moral system. I think that for something to be moral, it must be something which no one could reasonably reject as a standard for action (in an attempt to lead to agreement). So, I think that I can reasonably reject killing babies for fun because it is reasonable to desire to prevent the unnecessary death of infants. Similarly, I think that those infants would be able to reasonably reject the standard of action which leads to their deaths (or at least, someone could reject this on their behalf).

So, it might be the case that things that are reasonable for people to reject in our society might be unreasonable for others to reject. But I think that most of the things we view as immoral (ie not wearing blue clothing) are things which would be pretty difficult to imagine a society in which it would be reasonable for others to accept the system which allows their performance. (I'm sorry, I know that was a long, complicated sentence. But you've been up longer than I have and I still haven't had coffee.)

Basically, I think that we might have divergent (yet correct) morals in a very small number of cases (provided we live in very very different societies, which we do not). I simply think that in the vast majority of cases (I might even say all important cases) there is one correct moral decision to be made. And any other decision is ignoring the legitimate rational rejection of your action by someone who you have a moral obligation to consider.

I think that it's very important to hold a view of morality that allows you to say that some actions are immoral. It is important for establishing a judicial system, raising children, establishing codes of conduct, keeping social peace, etc. I am not content to say that while killing babies is wrong for me, it's okay for other people to kill babies (for fun) as long as their morals say it's okay. It's not. Killing babies (for fun) is wrong. It's not just that it makes me sick to think that someone can be justified in killing of babies for fun. I also want to keep people from killing babies. I want to put baby killers in jail. I want to stop other societies from killing babies (if any do). I want my (future) babies to be safe from being killed by people who are legitimately justified in their infanticide by their morals. I want people to be taught that killing babies is wrong (for everyone). I don't think any of these things are possible if we allow the kind of moral relativism it seems you hold.

Okay, that's my view. I can spell out the contractualist line (the "reasonably rejecting blah blah blah" thing) more if you want, but I think this gets the point across.

-Katy

Wow, I'm posting a comment on my own blog. Weird.

Andrew: I agree that there are certain things which would be universally considered to be immoral. However, I don't think we should go about creating some sort of standard declaring that these things are and always will be immoral. Everyone probably considers these things to be immoral, so I say let it be, and people can analyze it and philosophize about it all they want, without having some reasonably permanent moral code hanging around their necks.

This whole idea seems Orwellian to me, too, but more in the 1984 sense than in the Animal Farm sense: the thought police arresting citizens for disagreeing with Airstrip One's (Washington's? The Neo-conservatives'? The philosophers'?) moral code and such.

In response to Katy, I'd like to bring up the Nazi Germany thing again. Hitler and his crew were, from their point of view, morally correct to wage genocide against the Jews. That's not a small number of people, either -- there were millions of people who hated Jews. My morals don't allow me to hate someone based on their culture, but those who commit genocide (think Jihad today, think Rwanda in the '90s, think the New World with Cortes and friends, think Bangladesh in the '70s...) obviously have morals that differ from mine.

When does a segment of a population with a certain moral belief become large enough to make that particular belief part of the moral standard?

Doesn't this pave the way for a "bad" moral standard (what if the Nazis had won the war?)?

If so, it has a huge potential to backfire, so why implement it?

Also, what about the Big Brother-ish Orwellian aspects?

If freedom of expression can be considered a "universal" moral good, then what happens when people start getting punished for doing "immoral" things (isn't sodomy still illegal in parts of America? I understand we mostly don't care whether sodomy is illegal, but what if we're the minority?)?

I am particularly worried that there is a concept of an absolute 'right' or an absolute 'wrong' set of moral codes. Thinking back over the history of recorded ethos (and pathos) it is horrifying to imagine that one of them was right!

Katy said that you needed a single concept of morality in order to enforce a judicial system or raise children. My response to that is two-fold. First a successful judicial system does not require the morals on which it is based to be right, but for the system to be flexible with time (i.e. changing mores) and circumstance. This is equally true of raising children. For example scolding your child for walking against a crosswalk sign serves the purpose of keeping them safe and trying to instill a respect for the law. As the child grows up, however, scolding them for the same thing is almost counter-productive. At some point they are old enough to face the consequences of their own actions, whether that is a ticket or an accident. The second part of my response relies heavily on the first. In a society, the purpose of laws and punishment is to try and keep the majority of the people within the bounds of a set of productive, interactive, and healthy norms. These norms reflect less on the morality of the people enforcing them than on the need to organize society into something that can be dealt with. A small village has very little need for a specific set of laws as the norms are enforced through social punishment. A very large society must have laws because the force of social punishment is taken away from small groups because there is no arbitrator. (E.g. dragging someone out into the middle of the street and hanging someone is no longer acceptable because most people don't believe that having a certain color skin is a crime.) The larger the society the more essential laws become, and the more flexible the mores those laws are based on must become.

The argument about killing babies for fun is interesting. By specifically stating that you believe killing babies for fun was wrong you've left open the question of killing babies for business (think Chinese girl-babies being drowned), or the question of killing non-human babies (hunting, for food or for pleasure), what about killing babies that aren't your own race for fun? Part of the problem was that you tried to come up with an absolute with which everyone could agree. Not, that I disagree, but I know there are groups out there that would like to kill babies for fun (I am not just talking about sociopaths and murderers, but of cults and people bent on genocide). In a hundred years when the population of the earth is such that humanity is slowly dying will it still be immoral to kill babies for fun?

As for there being universally moral concepts, I think we are kidding ourselves to believe there exists even one such concept. Katy brings up a good point though, that we have a very similar set of mores because we grew up in basically the same society. For the subset of non-sociopathic, non-Satan-worshipping, home-grown, media-blasted, middle-class Americans that we are a part of there are concepts that we feel should be universally moral. I just think that it hurts us to believe that those concepts are universally held. First, it blinds us to those others who may wish to kill babies for fun. Moreover, it blinds us to the ills our own ideas might be causing.

if the pork is that good, perhaps you should shoot the cook.

'"It is so good that when I am finished with it, I'll pay my check, walk straight into the kitchen and shoot the cook, and that is what I would like from you right now. To help me keep the balance by pulling the trigger"
"You want me to shoot the cook?"
"No, I'll shoot the cook, my cars parked out back anyway,"'

"I am particularly worried that there is a concept of an absolute 'right' or an absolute 'wrong' set of moral codes."

The thing is, I'm not saying that there is an absolute right or wrong set of moral codes. There is, however, only one way of judging if a set of moral codes is a legitimate one. This is by determining if the code could be reasonably rejected (in favor of another) by anyone in the affected group provided that we assume everyone will be working under idealized conditions. Example: under any system that deems baby killing acceptable, we must consider the reasonable desires of the babies involved. If there is an alternate moral code that will protect them from infanticide which cannot be reasonably rejected by others of the group, then it is wrong to implement this allowance for baby killing. The fact that we cannot imagine such a society or set of norms where this would be the case, then I am willing to say that this is as close as we'll get to a universal moral dictatum.

However, if it was the case that the death of babies was necessary (there was no other possible set of morals under which they could live and others not reasonably object) then I would admit that baby killing would be wrong. It might be because I was raised as you said, but I just can't imagine this. Notice, however, I am not saying that it is not possible. And this is why I don't think that the view I am propounding is as troublesome as you and Colin seem to think it is.

"This is equally true of raising children. For example scolding your child for walking against a crosswalk sign serves the purpose of keeping them safe and trying to instill a respect for the law. As the child grows up, however, scolding them for the same thing is almost counter-productive. At some point they are old enough to face the consequences of their own actions, whether that is a ticket or an accident."

I completely agree, but I hope that you now see how this is not a problem for my view. First, I don't think that we can really talk about crossing the street being a moral or immoral thing to do. I am concerned about things which we have actual moral convictions about: murder, rape, violence, etc. If you want to bring things like crossing the street without a crossing sign or wearing blue clothing (as colin offered) into the concept of morality, then I will conceede that different people can have equally correct morals on these points. However, I think that these are not the interesting points, and I would still say that on some points (those which I restrict morality to in my discussions here) it still holds that there can be wrong and right morals (though not by necessity).

But back to the child raising. My point is that we want to be right about telling our children what they can and cannot do and still be good people. They might not be wise if they cross the street without a crossing signal, but they are not immoral. I want my kids to know that if they kill someone, they're not just unwise or foolish, they are actually immoral. I also want to be justified in punishing people for immoral actions.

Anyway, I think that the points you made were good, but I think that it is still the case that the reason some morals are not legitimate is because they did not consider all beings which they have moral obligation to consider. This is the case with the nazis and societies who think that recreational infanticide is fun.

Okay, I think that's all for now.

-Katy

I have been thinking about this a lot and I have a couple of points about morality and logic (particularly, my own logic).

The assumption that a group in power has to "consider all beings which they have moral obligation to consider" is a high ideal. By which, I mean it presupposes the moral that all beings are created equal, and that the group in power recognizes this moral. Point-in-fact, most groups which wage war, 'jihads', genocides, and the general killing of babies (and innocent adults) do so because they feel a moral imperative quite the opposite from "everyone is created equal." They often are fighting under the assumption that they are killing the lesser or immoral group which is offensive merely in its existence.
The argument that, if anyone could reasonably object to the treatment of those with the power to set morals those morals should be deemed wrong holds several assumptions about those without the power. First it presumes that their logic is our own. It presumes that they are not exactly like the group in power. It also presumes that you have the right to make that evaluation. (The most illustrative example I can give of this is about rickshaw drivers. A western sees a servant carrying other people about who must be ashamed of their position in life when they look at the rickshaw driver. A rickshaw driver however is an honored person in his society; his job is honored and they are personally honored to be doing it. Another example is of a participant of true SMDS, where what "society" deems abusive and degrading is turned into love and art.)

I am sorry that you think I get off point with the use of examples, but I think that most every line of logic leads to a similar, sometimes more comprehensive, sometimes more comprehensible, line of logic. More importantly, I think that most lines of logic are empty unless applied to their natural conclusion. I am also never comfortable with an idea (or more importantly a conclusion) unless I can explain it four or five different ways or give four or five examples of it.

This is a very interesting topic. Let me apply the ideas of my favorite heavyweight to talk about this: Quine.

His argument on this would be as follows:

Hypothesis: Morals imply a standard for action (imply or equals? I'll go with imply for now...)

So by simple set theory we have the following arguments:

1) Theory implies observation
T -> O

2) An observation is the composition of prior assumptions
O = (p1 || p2 || ... || pn)

By symmetry then, a theory is the composition of a number of hypotheses
T = (h1 || h2|| ... ||hn)

But if even one of our hypotheses is wrong?

(~h1 || ~h2 || ... ||~hn)
= ~(h1 || h2|| ... ||hn)
= ~T

It is therefore demonstrated that we cannot determine the validity of a hypothesis with a particular observation alone. Furthermore, it is possible (and very likely) to have an underdetermined theory. What does this mean for the mathematics of theories (theory of theories? :-) ) It means that if a theory is not sufficiently determined than it is no more or less valid than any other theory which holds a different "interpretation" of the theory. Thus Quine would say that Quantum Mechanics, or General Relativity is no more true than the Greeks belief that the gods were the forces behind nature. This seems on the surface like a disappointing result, but to anybody who practices science it gives one lots of hope. Take Quantum Mechanics for example, there are few physicists alive today who believe that QM in 100 years will be anything like it is today, it may not even be true at all. But for right now - it works for simple cases and it is the best tool we have at our disposal. But Quine says we can work with immunity as long as we are careful to realize that our theory is underdetermined and subject to what he called a "tribunal of experience".

I love that term: "Tribunal of experience". It implies that humankind as a whole can participate in the justifiability of a theory. Katy says "I think that for something to be moral, it must be something which no one could reasonably reject as a standard for action". This is a novel definition which I rather like as well. The problem is that we are left with a double edge sword. We have the ability to define a theory that is no less true for one culture than another, while expecting actions in accordance with the conflicting theories.

This is why Samuel Huntington predicted that future wars will be over ethical issues. As the world gets smaller and smaller the interfaces we have to other cultures get more severe, and any differences will be exacerbated to degrees never seen before.

I think the key is to realize is that there is a real foundation for recognizing that one underdetermined theory is no more or less valid than any other one. If we could all agree on the mathematical logic of this the world would be a much better place. Colin was absolutely correct in his diagnosis of the the definition of morally implied/dictated actions as being Orwellian. His mention of neocon philosophy is of particular interest because of the contributions of Strauss to the foundation of the neocon philosophy. Central to Straussian Philosophy is the idea that morals can be arrived at through careful study by the intellectual. What separates the Straussian from Socrates or Confucius is just pure snobbery (virtue cannot be obtained without a certain measure of intellect). And this is disappointing.

Just my two cents.

Oops. I mean && insted of || in the above logic.

Sorry for the mistake.

Or more accuratley:

1) T -> O

2) O = (p1 && p2 && ... && pn)

T = (h1 && h2 && ... && hn)

Then if
~(h1 && h2 && ... && hn)
= ~T
= (~h1 || ~h2 || ... || ~hn)

which is of course the interesting result under discussion. Just arrived at it incorrectly earlier...

Need more sleep... :-)...

For those of us who are not familiar with CS-style logic, here is a quick equivalence table.

(a || b || c) is the union (logical OR) of a, b, and c.

(a && b && c) is the intersection (logical AND) of a, b, and c.

(~a) is the negation (logical NOT) of a.

That should do it.

I suppose what I don't understand about your logical argument is it's relevance to moral theory, which is not an empirically based theory (and thus is not based on observation), in my understanding of it. But what interests me more is this:

"The problem is that we are left with a double edge sword. We have the ability to define a theory that is no less true for one culture than another, while expecting actions in accordance with the conflicting theories."

I am not sure what you mean by this. We do have the ability to define a theory that is true across cultures. We also expect actions in accordance with the individual applications of this theory in different cultures. I don't think, however, that there are conflicting theories. There are simply conflicting applications of this theory, which is perfectly understandable once you understand the over-arching theory that led to the conflict. I'd like to think that once we understand this, we are able to see that so long as what I'd like to call the universal application of moral theory is correctly implemented there is no real conflict. A conflict actually arises when we see a group which does not adhere to the moral dictate of rationally considering all beings with moral import and thus violates the over-arching dictates of the theory.

So, I suppose I don't see how this leads to a double edged sword.

I had an interesting conversation with Colin last night that had nothing to do with this, but I think I can make relevant. It was about the law of gravity and its application on Earth and Mars. The law of gravity is meant to explain gravitational force in any location in which you apply it. It will predict gravitational laws on Earth and Mars equally well, so long as you know enough about Mars and Earth. You wouldn't expect the law of gravity to give you the same results for Earth and Mars because there are different factors that must be considered with the law of gravity.

I want to think of moral imperatives like the law of gravity. There are incorrect applicatios of moral maxims just like there are incorrect applications of the law of gravity. But we shouldn't expect all applications of moral maxims to yield the same results across cultures and societies, because there are different things that must be considered in different societies. I don't see how this is a problem.

Okay, I think I might have beaten this topic to death, but it's been fun.

-Katy

I understand that you feel this topic has been beaten to death, but please humor one last post in the spirit of Jefferson and Adams: “Let neither one of us die without fully explaining ourselves to each other...”

“We do have the ability to define a theory that is true across cultures”. This is an inescapably mathematical statement. Let me reword it: There exists a theory/truth/moral that is both true in Culture A and Culture B. I do not see how this can be avoided.

Confucius spent a great deal of time writing about how the first step to solving a problem was to put it in it's proper place with proper terminology. This is prudent here as it is with all matters of philosophy. An examination of the statement “there exists a ...” uncovers the need to define existence and truth. This gets tricky as most philosophers cannot agree on what defines existence, or the origins and properties of truth.

What Quine provides us is a way to see that we can be certain about some things even if we are not absolutely certain. The statement “We have the ability to define a theory that is true across cultures” is only comfortable to us because of the Tribunal of experience. Let me use mathematics to illustrate this point. We know 2+2 = 4. Number theorists can even prove this on a fundamental level. We are comfortable in the knowledge that millennia of experience backs it up (the tribunal). But now lets look at say: the distribution of prime numbers. Human kind knows next to nothing about it. We have no certainty about it. But is it possible that someday we will be as certain about it as 2+2 = 4? Yes. Entirely possible.

My point in all of this was simply that indeed we do have the ability to define a theory that is true across cultures. But because this is not a simple task, our definition will be subject to much change due to the tribunal of experience (as we refine our definition). This is inevitable due to human nature. It is also what makes life interesting. Take Socrates for example: he spent most of his life refining his def inion of what is the most noble human trait before settling on virtue. This is a beautiful example of the tribunal of experience.

But in all of this is the realization that our observations about what is right and what is just and what is moral, are subject to the tribunal of experience as well. And because of the fact of confirmation holism (it only takes one of our observation to be false to make the whole premise false), that we should stake any claims that our truths are any more right than anybody else's.

Cheerio!

“We do have the ability to define a theory that is true across cultures”. This is an inescapably mathematical statement. Let me reword it: There exists a theory/truth/moral that is both true in Culture A and Culture B. I do not see how this can be avoided.

If you want to formalize my sentence, it is most appropriately done as follows: There exists a theory, x, such that for all cultures, y, (x is true for y) & (we are able to define x).

The problem with your analysis is that it is equating theory, truth and morals in a way I have been at pains to avoid in this discussion. I am making a statement about a theory _with which to develop_ a system of morals. Not one that would be a system of morals, as your formalization implies.

Additionally, I don't think that there is a problem with existence and truth in this discussion. I will grant you whatever rational definition of truth you want, and my statement is still true (or as true as it is on any other definition of truth). Additionally, no one that I know of (that anyone takes seriously) actually thinks that the problem of existence is a fundamental problem for the use of existential quantifiers. I am saying that if any theories exist, we will be able to make one that fits the above statement. If theories do not exist under whatever idea of existence you have, then under whatever term existence* you grant theories to have, that's the meaning of the existential quantifier for my sentence. No more, no less.

Also, I think that saying that the theory will change over time due to evolution of human thought is missing the point. The point is that, yes, it might be the case that at some point, a group of people might say "an action is moral iff it involves a bologna sandwich". The beauty of the theory I'm pushing is that it can for any group of rational beings, anywhere, at any time, be applied to determine whether or not a system of morals is correct.

And don't worry, I don't mind beating dead horses, but that is another moral debate entirely.

You misunderstand me.

My point in formalizing your statement was just an attempt to explain myself to you because you said that you did not understand my point. Nothing more. As such, it was my intent to do it simply. And that point is that the statement is mathematical. A point which you yourself just agreed to by formalizing it in an even stricter sense than I choose to.

I understand what it is you are saying. I just disagree because our understanding of everything is based on observations and that makes it flawed. As a physicist I am consequently concerned with quantifying that error. I do not disagree with you in saying that we can. I just believe that we can +/- some error.

As for the problem of existence, I refer you to the literature. There is no, I repeat no consensus on the definition of existence. Ontology being what it is factions pretty quickly into the realists and nominalists. It is hard to get consensus even after choosing one side of the argument. And there are serious people on both sides of the argument who have earned the right to be taken seriously. I am not saying we can't define existence, I just wished to point out that it is not easy and there are (and most likely always will be) differing opinions.

Let me close with Quines definition which I find rather humorous: 'To be assumed as an entity is to be assumed as a value of a variable .'